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This paper examines the extent to which effective political participation can be 
achieved through minority consultative bodies, and what obstacles and 
shortcomings can potentially occur in practice. It explores the Kosovo case, 
where a variety of minority consultative bodies were established in recent years 
to ensure effective minority participation and representation at the highest 
decision-making levels. It will be argued that despite the prospects of the 
established legal and institutional framework, these bodies have fallen short in 
providing meaningful representation of minority interests and needs in Kosovo. 
This is largely affected by the intermeshed interests of elites among the 
majority and minority communities that prioritize their narrow interests to the 
expense of the developmental and emancipatory needs of marginalized 
minorities in Kosovo. Hence, higher commitment and cooperation between 
governmental authorities and minority representatives, together with adequate 
resources, are critical for ensuring effective minority participation in the public 
sphere.  
 
Keywords: the right to effective participation, minority consultative bodies, 
Kosovo.  
 
Accommodating the interests and rights of minorities has been one of the major 
challenges in Kosovo, before and after the declaration of independence in 2008. 
Indeed, international support for Kosovo’s statehood is rooted in Kosovo’s 
constitutional commitment and promise to respect and promote the highest standards 
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of minority rights.1 The institutional framework of minority consultative bodies 
consists of a Communities Consultative Council, based in the Office of the President 
of Kosovo; the Committee on Rights and Interests of Communities, based in the 
Kosovo Assembly; and the Office for Community Affairs, established within the 
Office of the Prime Minister of Kosovo. Initiated by the international community, the 
establishment and functioning of minority consultative bodies in Kosovo is seen as an 
appropriate mechanism for ensuring that constitutional commitments on minority 
rights are effectively implemented through direct engagement with minority 
representatives in consultative, decision-making and coordination processes. 
Theoretical debates and policy prescriptions suggest that beyond fuzzy 
constitutional commitments, minority consultative bodies could be a promising 
mechanism to ensure the effective political participation of minority groups. They are 
seen as a space in which minority political groups, civil society representatives and 
governmental bodies can interact, and where the views, concerns and interests of 
minorities can be effectively incorporated within the process of policy planning, 
implementation and evaluation (Weller, 2010). To explore how these theoretical 
prescriptions apply in practice we will examine case of Kosovo, where the 
international community has invested extensively in developing an ambitious 
institutional and policy framework for empowering minority communities. In 
particular, we will assess how these mechanisms work in practice, by analysing their 
performance and achievements two years after their establishment.  
This is the first academic paper to explore the performance of these 
institutions in practice, and it will focus on the Roma, Ashkali and Egyptian (further, 
RAE) communities, as the most vulnerable and non-dominant communities. After a 
short theoretical and legal discussion of the changing nature of minority rights, with a 
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focus on the right to effective political participation, the paper will then briefly 
discuss the extensive legal and policy framework for minority participation before and 
after Kosovo’s independence. After this, we will provide a critical assessment of the 
performance and achievements of these minority consultative bodies, which are part 
of the main political institutions in Kosovo. Their performance will be assessed 
against a set of conditions prescribed in the legal documents that established them, 
and the broader political criteria evident in academic and policy discussions. Although 
this study falls between fact gathering and theory testing, the focus on a single case 
enables us to draw “middle-range contingent generalizations”2 as to whether minority 
consultative bodies are becoming promising mechanisms for promoting effective 
minority participation.  
In general, the study suggests that the establishment of minority consultative 
bodies in Kosovo is a positive development, especially in their provision of a 
deliberative forum for marginalized minorities. However, it also indicates that their 
performance over the last two years has not been as satisfactory as expected. There 
seems to be a lack of sufficient institutional cooperation and coordination among 
these bodies, the government of Kosovo and the international community. From an 
internal perspective the members of these bodies lack initiative, as well as the 
resources, experience and capacity needed to utilize the institutional space effectively 
and thus deliver properly on their mandate of improving the political and 
socioeconomic conditions of the Roma, Ashkali and Egyptian populations in Kosovo. 
To a large extent, the weaknesses of minority consultative bodies identified in this 
study are also result of divided RAE political communities and their disorganized 
civil society. Notwithstanding, the extensive attention given to the Serb community 
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and political interference by the government has negatively affected the performance 
of these bodies. 
Recognizing these shortcomings, we argue that the effectiveness of minority 
consultative bodies is conditional, on the one hand, on a commitment by 
governmental authorities to provide sufficient consideration, resources and 
independence for minority representatives and, on the other hand, on the meaningful 
representation of minority interests through the election of skilled and experienced 
minority representatives who are committed to working for the needs and interests of 
their respective communities. Overcoming internal identity and interest-related 
disputes among the Roma, Ashkali and Egyptian communities would increase their 
bargaining capabilities within the consultative bodies and ensure wider 
accommodation of their communities’ interests. As the mandate and scope of work of 
these bodies is intertwined and mutually dependent, inter-institutional cooperation and 
coordination of activities it is of critical importance in ensuring effective performance.  
 
The right to effective participation: from recognition to effective 
implementation?  
 
Over the last two decades, minority issues have attracted considerable international 
attention and recognition. The international community has realized that violation of 
minority rights by host states has the potential to trigger internal conflicts with 
regional and international implications, and that minority issues are thus a legitimate 
international concern. Protracted and intractable conflicts are often rooted on the 
violation of minority groups, which are manifested through ethnic division, grievance, 
violent confrontation and secession attempts (Coleman, 2003: 1-37). Consequently, 
the protection of national minorities is becoming a recognized standard of 
consolidated democracies, particularly in the wider Europe, and a precondition for 
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accession to the Euro-Atlantic institutions (Weller et. al., 2008). Over the past two 
decades, minority issues have received special attention in cases of peace settlements, 
foreign aid conditionality, state recognition and legitimacy, and membership in 
international institutions. This recognition and ‘internationalization’ of minority 
rights, as Will Kymlicka (2008: 14) asserts, represents a “complex mixture of 
humanitarian, self-interested and ideological reasons”. 
The recognition of minority rights in international and regional human rights 
covenants marks an important step forward, but it is not sufficient when it comes to 
the effective implementation of minority rights in practice. As witnessed in certain 
cases, the recognition of minority rights by national governments in their 
constitutional design does not necessarily guarantee effective minority participation. 
On a related point, Resnick argues that “ethnic minorities as holders of civic rights 
and political freedoms under a clearly prescribed set of constitutional and institutional 
norms, citizens, whatever their linguistic or cultural background, ought to be able to 
transcend the more particularistic loyalties that retrograde nationalists seek to foster” 
(Resnick, 2004: 45). In this regard, the creation of distinct institutional and policy 
mechanisms that ensure the direct representation of minorities and their interests has 
recently become a promising tool for minority emancipation in multiethnic, post-
conflict and divided societies. Although the nature of internal disputes in these types 
of societies might be different, the salience of minority issues remains largely the 
same. 
Political participation in different contexts has been crucial for promoting 
democratic values across populations, in generating trust in political institutions, and 
in promoting free, competitive political behaviour (McAllister and White, 2009: 186). 
Specifically, in post-conflict and divided societies creating conditions for 
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accommodating and integrating the rights and interests of minority groups is seen as a 
critical condition for transforming the conflict, regaining trust, and reconciling and 
normalizing social relations between different ethnic groups. According to Kymlicka, 
the right to effective participation in the minimal reading means “simply that the 
members of national minorities should not face discrimination in the exercise of their 
standard political rights to vote, to engage in advocacy and to run for office”, whereas 
by a maximal reading “effective participation requires, not just that members of 
minorities can vote or run for office, but that they actually achieve some degree of 
representation in the legislature” (Kymlicka, 2008: 29). In a step forward from this 
maximalist conception, Marc Weller notes that “full and effective participation of 
national minorities in public life has established itself as a right in international 
documents concerning the protection of national minorities” (Weller, 2010: 482). 
Indeed, the effective participation of minorities in decision-making processes 
is promoted by several regional and international organizations and codified in 
various political and legal documents. The Framework Convention for the Protection 
of National Minorities (FCNM) of the Council of Europe outlines that states parties 
should create “conditions necessary for the effective participation of persons 
belonging to national minorities in cultural, social and economic life and in public 
affairs, in particular those affecting them” (CoE, 1995).3 Increasingly, the 
participation of minorities through consultative mechanisms is become an important 
way of addressing minority issues. For instance, the OSCE 1999 Lund 
Recommendations for the Effective Participation of National Minorities in Public Life 
outlines that: 
States should establish advisory or consultative bodies within appropriate institutional 
frameworks to serve as channels for dialogue between governmental authorities and 
national minorities. Such bodies might also include special purpose committees for 
addressing such issues as housing, land, education, language, and culture. The 
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composition of such bodies should reflect their purpose and contribute to more 
effective communication and advancement of minority interests.4 
 
On a broader level, the right to effective political participation is closely 
related to debates on deliberative democracy and power-sharing in divided societies. 
According to John Ferejohn deliberative democracy would “require that public 
decisions be chosen based on actual public deliberations, that everyone have effective 
access to the deliberative forum, that every citizen be capable of giving and being 
moved by good reasons, and that everyone accept the obligations that follow from the 
deliberate choice of a public action” (Ferejohn, 2000: 79). While this remains an ideal 
aspiration of a participatory and inclusive democracy, ethnic power-sharing is 
favoured in many post-conflict and divided societies.5 According to Lijphart, “power 
sharing denotes the participation of representatives of all significant communal groups 
in political decision-making, especially at the executive level” (Lijphart, 2008: 3). As 
a result of power-sharing arrangements following peace settlement or regime change, 
minority ethnic groups gain privileged representation in central decision-making 
bodies, and enjoy special procedural and institutional mechanisms to protect their 
ethnic interests (Roeder and Rothchild, 2005). Both alternatives are problematic for 
achieving the effective political participation of minorities. In practice it is doubtful 
whether minorities are able to access the deliberative forum due to the economic, 
educational and cultural barriers they face, and similarly elite representation in power-
sharing arrangements often results in the entrenchment of clan interests, misuse of 
power and internal marginalization of minority population (Valadez, 2001). 
Concerning ethnic power-sharing, Roeder and Rothchild (2005) argue that in 
some cases these arrangements empower ethnic elites, which risks escalating the 
conflict and delaying prospects for self-sustaining peace. Contrary to the power-
sharing propositions, Roeder and Rothchild advocate a power-dividing strategy that 
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incorporates three elements: civil liberties, multiple majorities, and checks and 
balances. They envisage that divided-power democracies allocate state powers 
between government and civil society with strong, enforceable civil liberties that take 
daily responsibilities out of the hands of government. They distribute the remaining 
responsibilities to government among separate, independent organs which represent 
alternative, crosscutting majorities (Roeder and Rothchild, 2005: 15). The power-
dividing strategy is similar to the Gutmann and Thompson (1996) principles for 
deliberative processes, which consist of reciprocity, publicity and accountability. 
These principles advocate for mutually acceptable and consensual decisions, open and 
transparent deliberation process, and accountable and justifiable decision-making 
processes. To achieve this, Gutmann and Thompson assert that it is necessary to 
ensure basic liberty, basic opportunity, and equal opportunity, including the right to 
free speech and assembly, education opportunities and equal access to resources and 
public positions.  
One attempt to overcome the limits of ethnic power-sharing and to embed a 
‘light footprint’ of deliberative democracy involves the creation of special minority 
institutional bodies, varying from consultative and coordination mechanisms to co-
decision and self-governance mechanisms. Marc Weller has developed a 
comprehensive legal typology of different special minority bodies where he sets out 
their distinct functions. Similarly, the Council of Europe Advisory Committee to the 
FCNM has grouped together four comprehensive functions of special minority bodies: 
a) organization, mobilization and coordination among minority representative 
organizations; b) contribution to the drafting of legislation; c) contribution to 
governmental programming; and d) participation in reporting to international 
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mechanisms (CoE, 2006: 11). Of particular relevance are consultative and co-decision 
bodies, which we will discuss in the following section.  
In most cases, minority consultative bodies provide a platform for interaction 
between minority political and civil society representatives and governmental bodies, 
and aim to incorporate the views, concerns and interests of minority communities 
within the process of governmental policy planning, implementation and evaluation. 
The conditions of membership, types of activities and division of tasks are proscribed 
in national legislation or in special government decrees. Minority consultative bodies 
are also tasked with maintaining public visibility, communicating with their 
respective communities, and sharing information with the general public (CoE, 2006: 
11). While the organization, mobilization and coordination of tasks to help enhance 
the effectiveness of these consultative mechanisms, Weller argues that “another 
benefit arising from this function is the facilitation of inter-ethnic dialogue that is 
particularly useful in states where ethnic tensions persist” (Weller, 2010: 491). 
Consultative bodies in some cases have the potential to engage with donors to set 
priorities and collaborate in implementing programmes dedicated to minorities. They 
can also contribute to enhancing minority rights through reporting to international 
human and minority rights monitoring bodies (CoE, 2006: 13). 
On the other hand, the co-decision mechanisms enable minority groups to hold 
certain legislative and executive powers when it comes to protecting their rights and 
interests in the policy making and policy implementation processes. Weller 
distinguishes two sub-types of co-decision mechanisms: soft and hard forms of co-
decision (Weller, 2010: 483). While the former is applicable when legislative or 
policy initiatives cannot be approved without considering the views of minorities, the 
latter applies in cases where minority groups have a direct right to undertake 
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legislative initiatives, as well as hold the right to block legislative and policy 
initiatives affecting their communities’ rights and interests. The co-decision 
mechanism applies to a wide range of functions, such as: initiating a legislative 
process, reviewing and commenting on legislative initiatives to observe compliance 
with minority rights standards, campaigning to support drafting or revising legislation 
relevant to minority communities, and raising awareness on the implementation of 
legislation and policy relevant to minority interests (CoE, 2006: 12). In principle, this 
function of drafting legislation is often an attribute of co-decision and consultative 
mechanisms.  
In addition, coordination mechanisms, according to Weller are not “genuine 
minority consultative bodies”, but rather coordination points between different 
governmental sectors that address minority affairs. Nonetheless, minority 
representatives may be consulted by these coordination mechanisms to improve their 
understanding of the developmental priorities that concern different minority groups. 
Coordination mechanisms and consultative mechanism participate in assessing 
community needs, setting policy priorities, disseminating information, fund-raising, 
and monitoring and evaluating the performance of programmes (Weller, 2010: 492). 
Finally, although these minorities special bodies take on different functions in 
different contexts, it is asserted that their effective performance is widely conditional 
on dissent representation, active participation and commitment among the minority 
representatives, sufficient resources and operation free from political interference 
(ibid.: 499). Equally, the effective participation of minorities and the successful 
functioning of minority consultative bodies are dependent on the commitment and 
dedication of government and minority representatives. In addition, the effective 
functioning of minority consultative bodies also requires adequate resources (OSCE, 
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1999: 10). Often, the funding of these bodies comes from the government public 
budget. Such funding must be politically unconditional and not influence the process 
and outcomes of these bodies. Weller argues that some decisions on the allocation of 
funds should be given to the minority bodies (Weller, 2010: 499). Indeed, the work of 
these bodies should be visible and inclusive for members of minorities and the general 
public.  
 
Minority participation before and after Kosovo’s independence 
 
Following the NATO intervention in Kosovo and the establishment of the UN Interim 
Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), a non-majoritarian democracy was 
established based on power-sharing arrangements that aimed to reconcile different 
ethnic groups through a proportional electoral system and broad mechanisms for 
representation in Kosovo.6 The 2001 Constitutional Framework created a comfortable 
environment for minority participation, guaranteeing minority communities 20 out of 
120 seats in the Kosovo Assembly, of which ten were reserved for Serbs, four for 
RAE, three for Bosniaks, two for Turks, and one for Gorani.7 Within the Assembly of 
Kosovo, a Committee on Rights and Interests of Communities (CRIC) with co-
decision powers was established. CRIC was granted hard co-decision authority and 
tasked to review laws and make recommendations on draft laws, to ensure that 
community rights and interests were adequately addressed. Regarding representation 
in the executive branch, the Constitutional Framework ruled that at least one of the 
ministers in the Kosovo government should be from the Kosovo Serb community and 
one from another community. At the municipal level, minority communities in 
Kosovo also enjoyed a number of mechanisms to protect their rights and interests, 
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such as a Communities Committee, and a Municipal Office for Communities and 
Returns (MOCR).   
The expanded legal framework after Kosovo’s independence in 2008 
guarantees minority communities, among other rights, the right to political 
representation. The Constitution of Kosovo and the Law on the Protection and 
Promotion of the Rights of Communities constitute the core legal framework for 
community representation in Kosovo. However, their implementation remains 
problematic. Monitoring this minority legal framework, in 2009 the Council of 
Europe Commissioner for Human Rights observed that “the Constitution provides a 
good legal framework for human rights protection”, but underlines that “it is now 
incumbent on the authorities, including the local authorities, to put these 
commitments into practice” (CoE, 2009: 5). Parallel to the completion of the legal 
framework on minority rights and participation, several conditions are considered as 
fundamental for the integration of minorities in post-independence Kosovo, including 
public participation which would ensure adequate representation and association 
rights in the public sphere; integration in public institutions, especially in the sectors 
of governance, rule of law and human rights protection; the establishment of 
appropriate inclusive education and health facilities; promotion of independent media; 
physical security and equal human rights protection; and community identity 
development (KIPRED, 2006). 
Although the Kosovo institutions have created a comprehensive legal 
framework with regard to community rights and their political representation, RAE 
communities8 remain the most vulnerable communities in Kosovo.9 While the 
concerns of the Serb community continue to attract the interest and funding of the 
international community, members of Kosovo’s RAE communities receive less 
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attention (Kosovo government, 2009: 10). Indeed, the overall political emancipation 
of these communities in Kosovo is held hostage to several factors, including social 
and political status, low levels of education, high population growth, poor health 
conditions, lack of civil registration and basic legal documentation, discrimination, 
their status as “political pawns” between Albanian and Serb communities, their lack 
of a kin state, and an untrained and self-appointed leadership (Visoka, 2008: 154). 
These are strong obstacles to social cohesion, which contributes to the low level of 
RAE involvement and participation in political, civil, educational and health 
institutions. 
The internal political tensions among Roma, Ashkali and Egyptian parties 
affect the quality of representation and the appropriate utilization of the institutional 
space offered to them. As is also the case with the majority Albanian political 
structure, Roma, Ashkali and Egyptian political parties in Kosovo continue to be 
organized along ethnic, community and geographical lines. As the monoethnic parties 
tend to appeal to a single community, “their program, membership and voters thus 
largely hail from only one group, be it the majority or minority [...] often with 
conservative or nationalist parties, the inclusion of other groups is purely tokenistic 
and minimal” (Bieber, 2008: 14). Parallel to this, cooperation and coordination among 
Roma, Ashkali and Egyptian parties is low and their political agenda is quite 
exclusive. Instead of creating a common political platform to articulate and advocate 
for those issues that are of greatest importance to the Roma, Ashkali and Egyptian 
communities, most of these parties have joined parliamentary groups dominated by 
Albanian and Serb political parties. In some cases, even parliamentary members who 
come from the same political party pursue different political agenda and do not share 
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the same parliamentary group. Similarly, civil society groups representing RAE 
communities are criticized for being ineffective and divided (Redjepi et. al., 2009: 8).  
In December 2008, the Kosovo government developed its Strategy for the 
Integration of Roma, Ashkali and Egyptian Communities, which sought to address 
crucial issues such as anti-discrimination; education; employment and economic 
empowerment; health and social issues; housing and informal settlements; return and 
reintegration; registration and documents; gender; culture, media and information; 
participation and representation; and security and policing (Kosovo government, 
2008:7). Even though the strategy was adopted in late 2008, after a process of 
consultation that lasted almost two years, so far no component of the strategy has 
been implemented. Despite the unsupportive social environment that faces these 
marginalized communities, the presence of social capital and a synergized network 
between Roma, Ashkali and Egyptian civil society organizations might contribute 
significantly to regressive implementation of the strategy. In other words internal 
fragmentation means that RAE political parties remain unaccountable, and delay 
equipping the minority consultative bodies with appropriate and qualified staff who 
would be able to adequately address the concerns of these communities. 
 
Minority consultative bodies in Kosovo  
 
Within the framework of the Kosovo Constitution, RAE communities in Kosovo, 
among others, are represented by the Community Consultative Council (the Council) 
in the Office of the President, the Office for Community Affairs (OCA) in the Office 
of the Prime Minister, and the Parliamentary Committee on Community Rights and 
Interests and the Returns (CRIC) in the Assembly. These representative bodies aim to 
provide RAE communities (as well as other community groups in Kosovo) with the 
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opportunity to represent their political interests directly at the highest levels of 
governance and decision-making in Kosovo. 
Established by Presidential Decree on 15 September 2008, the Communities 
Consultative Council is a consultative body with no formal veto powers on legislation 
or policy and consisting mainly of representative from political parties and civil 
society organizations―a body that aims to give a voice to community civil society 
and grant their representatives access to governmental policy affairs. The Council is 
tasked with providing communities with an opportunity to participate in assessing 
their needs, and designing, monitoring and evaluating programmes dedicated to their 
members. It is also tasked with recommending how funds should be allocated by 
international donors and the Kosovo institutions, to ensure that projects meet the 
needs and interests of minority communities.10 The Council is composed of civil 
society representatives from all communities in Kosovo, and a small number of 
representatives from the Kosovo government who work on minority issues. 
The second body, the Committee on Rights and Interests of Communities is a 
hard co-decision mechanism based in the Kosovo Assembly that provides legislative 
oversight on issues relating community rights and interests, as envisaged by Article 
78 of the Kosovo Constitution. Parallel to this, CRIC plays a significant role in 
protecting the so-called “vital interests” of minority communities in Kosovo, 
highlighted in Article 81 of the Constitution. CRIC’s mandate is a continuation of the 
previous Constitutional Framework of 2001. The overall mission of CRIC is to act as 
a legislative catalyst for minority rights in Kosovo. By performing this mandate, 
CRIC is in an ideal position to enhance and protect community rights through “its 
own initiative, propose laws and other measures within the responsibilities of the 
Assembly as it deems appropriate to address the concerns of Communities” (Kosovo 
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Constitution, 2008). Concerning its structure, the Kosovo Constitution entrenches 
CRIC as a permanent committee within the Kosovo Assembly, which is composed of 
one third of members who represent the group of deputies of the Assembly holding 
seats reserved or guaranteed for the Serbian Community, one third of members who 
represent the group of MPs from communities that are not in the majority, and one 
third of members from the majority community represented in the Assembly. 
The third body, the Office for Community Affairs in the Office of the Prime 
Minister was established in May 2008 to advise the Prime Minister of Kosovo on all 
communities’ related issues, and coordinate policy and practical issues related to all 
communities in Kosovo. As an office within the Prime Minister’s Office, the OCA 
has the opportunity to contribute to, analyse and advise on the government’s policy 
affecting communities’ rights and interests; to develop and monitor implementation of 
government strategies related to minority communities; and to monitor the 
implementation of laws and policies affecting communities.11 
Earlier in this paper we described the general mandate and function of 
minority consultative bodies, which presented an accumulation of theoretical and 
cross-case comparative knowledge. Deriving from them were four crucial aspects that 
can help evaluate the performance and effectiveness of minority consultative bodies: 
organization, mobilization and coordination; contributing to the drafting and 
reviewing of legislation; contributing to governmental programming; and 
participating in reporting to international mechanisms. Setting a framework for 
assessing the performance of minority consultative bodies in Kosovo requires a set of 
evaluation criteria that follow the general standards and normative obligations that 
prescribe the conduct of minority mechanisms, but that also recognize the context and 
local conditions, thus inferring realistic and relativist expectation. With this in mind 
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the remainder of this article will evaluate these four performance aspects of minority 
consultative bodies in Kosovo against three criteria: internal consolidation and 
representation, tangible and mandate-related results, and wider external support or 
obstacles.  
Organization, mobilization and coordination  
 
One of the primary functions of minority consultative bodies is to organize and 
mobilize minority communities by building up the capacity of minority representative 
groups and coordinating activities between different groups. We discovered that so far 
there seems to be insufficient cooperation and coordination between RAE political 
representatives and civil society organizations. In general, there is a negative dynamic 
of competition and clashes between these two sides in terms of allocating 
development and humanitarian assistance to the RAE populations, in supporting 
political parties and platforms, and in terms of identity politics and cultural affiliation.  
Despite extensive support from the European Centre for Minority Issues 
(ECMI) to establish a sustainable representation system, the Council still lacks an 
established practice of organizing, mobilizing and coordinating activities with 
representative non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and local RAE populations. 
Though most current members are affiliated with NGOs, there are still challenges in 
communicating and coordinating the work of local NGOs and using the Council to 
bring communal problems to higher decision-making levels.12 Initially, it was agreed 
that for each of the communities represented in the Council, an umbrella NGO is 
assigned to coordinate communication with other local NGOs. However, due to 
disagreements in the internal selection process, it was agreed that CSO would serve as 
technical nominating mechanisms only. An exception to this was the Bosniak 
community who managed to establish an umbrella organization. Until recently, the 
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Council has operated with an informal budget allocated on annually basis by the 
Office of the President, and other supplementary aid from foreign donors. Indeed 
these budgetary issues have constrained their scope of activities and the quality of 
performance.  
A major weakness of these consultative bodies is the lack of inter-institutional 
cooperation and coordination. Insufficient inter-institutional cooperation seems to be a 
result of perceived competition and an overlap in the mandate of political leaders and 
civil society representatives. An OCA representative regularly attends the meetings of 
the Council, but beyond that there is no coordination of efforts and activities.13 
Similarly, representatives of different ministries seem to attend meetings in the 
Council but there is no subsequent coordination and cooperation. On several 
occasions members of the Council have invited ministers to discuss specific policy 
issues but random officers were sent who did not know the area of work and did not 
take follow-up accordingly.14 On this matter, a former Council member stated that 
“whenever governmental representatives were invited to the meetings they recorded 
the Councils inquiries but did not proceed afterwards in practice”.15 
The first-hand accounts from the key actors in these mechanisms reveal the 
sources and nature of tensions that impact on the internal consolidation and 
representation. Apart from few meetings called by external instances, there seems to 
be insufficient formalized contact between these bodies. An Ashkali member of CRIC 
declared that “non-cooperation between OCA and CRIC began when a Roma member 
of OCA was allocating the majority of funding to the Roma community, excluding 
two other sister communities”.16 An Ashkali who is well aware of the political 
circumstances declared that the OCA has not collaborated with CRIC, and there have 
been cases when individual members of CRIC have approached the OCA attempting 
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to find funds for projects for their narrow interests.17 Another Ashkali member of 
parliament (MP) affiliated with CRIC declared that “they have not met with the 
Council so far and it is them who should come and approach CRIC”.18 The same MP 
goes further to argue that “we are not united [...] Members of the Council seek to 
address their communities (local community) interests and needs, and we try to 
channel our own community’s interests”.19 However, there do seem to be few cases 
where MPs from the same community coordinate and cooperate with civil society 
representatives in the Council. For example, an Egyptian MP and member of CRIC 
asserted that he cooperates with the Egyptian representatives in the Council, and they 
coordinate what issues to raise.20  
In general, it appears that RAE representatives in these three bodies are aware 
of the need to collaborate, but their narrow interests and fragmented positions 
regarding the allocation of resources and political support for certain policies create 
tension. Certainly, this lack of cooperation and coordination suggests that the RAE 
communities are not yet ready to make use of the mechanisms that exist to support 
their effective participation. Furthermore, it seems that the narrow-minded and 
fragmented relationship within and between these communities also reflects the 
vulnerable social and civic position of the Roma, Ashkali and Egyptian communities, 
who are unable to hold their representatives accountable or use different lobbying 
techniques to advance communal interests.  
 
Contribution to drafting and reviewing legislation 
 
Minority consultative bodies are also entitled to initiate legislative processes, review 
and comment on legislative initiatives, and observe compliance with minority rights 
standards and interests. Since the Council’s establishment in 2008, its RAE 
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representatives have commented on a very small number of laws and government 
policies that affect RAE communities, for example on legislation related to RAE 
education and employment. However, the results of such efforts are still pending. 
Based on our findings, there is a generally a lack of initiative among RAE 
representatives in the Council, which is mainly affected by their lack of capacity, 
political weakness, and the lack of financial incentives to comment on and advocate 
for legislative initiatives beyond the scope of regular meetings. Here the quality of 
members plays an important role in ensuring the effective performance and 
implementation of the Council mandate. 
Despite some attempts to select particular laws that directly affect the rights 
and interests of communities in Kosovo, the Council has spent over a year struggling 
to consolidate itself internally. A review of meeting agendas and the issues discussed 
in the Council, shows that most of the time was spent on drafting a statute, internal 
operational rules and a working plan. Furthermore, during the first year it appears to 
have been difficult to execute the mandate of the Council due to a shortage of budget 
and staff. Apart from that, the Council has established four working groups, which 
review issues related to minority education and legislation, monitor the 
implementation of the Strategy for Integration of RAE Communities in Kosovo, and 
monitor the implementation of Council’s own Work Plan. These working groups are 
seen as instrumental in ensuring that all members contribute to reviewing legislation 
and addressing certain policy issues affecting communities. However, the lack of 
financial support and general initiative among members seems to obstruct the 
effective performance of these working groups. 
In terms of CRIC’s performance, the RAE representatives in the Kosovo 
Assembly have one of the lowest participation rates in parliamentary discussions. 
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Within CRIC, RAE representatives seem to be overshadowed by the political and 
financial priority accorded to the Serb community. Most of the RAE MPs pursue a 
‘political servitude strategy’, whereby in exchange for small donations they do not 
criticize the government, and in most cases follow the voting patterns of the majority. 
In general, the performance and the effectiveness of parliamentary committees within 
the Kosovo Assembly is considered weak due to a lack of capacity, expertise and 
political activism when handling draft laws in their field (KDI, 2009: 27). Similarly, 
the EU 2010 Progress Report for Kosovo also notes that the Kosovo Assembly needs 
to improve its “capacity to scrutinise draft legislation and monitor its implementation 
after adoption” as well as to “enhance the parliamentary oversight of government 
work” (EC, 2010: 7). CRIC is no exception to this general parliamentary trend. The 
Kosovo Democratic Institute is a local NGO in Kosovo that assesses the activism of 
MPs by measuring how often they participate in discussions, initiate urgent issues, 
propose agenda items and raise parliamentary questions.21 A table compiled by the 
authors (below) indicates that Roma, Ashkali and Egyptian MPs have had a very low 
level of parliamentary activism over the last two years.  
 
Source: Table compiled by authors to summarize KDI Scorecard, 2008-2010, Available at: 
http://www.kdi-kosova.org/alb/publications.php  
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Xhevdet Neziraj  IRDK  0.32 2.68 5.78 12.1 0.3 
Zylfi Merxha  PREBK  0.24 4.76 0.79 3 
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Etem Arifi  PDAK  0.00 1.21 0.00 1.5 
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Hafize Hajdini PDAK 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.5 0.1 
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The most active MP is the Egyptian political representative Xhevdet Neziraj 
from the New Democratic Initiative of Kosova (IRDK) with 12%. The worst cases are 
of Ashkali representatives where we can observe no participation at all in fulfilling 
the parliamentary mandate. Some of the Roma, Ashkali and Egyptian MPs with the 
lowest parliamentary participation have intentionally chosen a strategy of silence and 
compliance. By remaining silent in parliamentary sessions, they hope to ensure that 
their respective community and region is prioritized when it comes to governmental 
investment and donations.23 A CRIC member of the Ashkali community also 
suggested that they refrained from raising parliamentary questions due to their 
political affiliation with the governing party.24  
However, the same Ashkali MPs also mentioned a more obvious motivation 
behind this ‘parliamentary silence’, namely that as a result of such parliamentary 
behaviour they had succeeded in convincing the Ministry for Communities and 
Returns to allocate €200,000 to build houses for the Ashkali community in Dubrava, a 
village in the centre of Kosovo. The Office of the Prime Minister dedicated €200,000 
and the Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare €40,000 to the same housing project.25 
This clearly reflects how parliamentary mechanisms and community participation is 
exchanged for the reallocation of reconstruction funding, although it is clearly an 
unconditional obligation of the respective governmental agencies to help these 
communities regardless of the actions of their representatives in parliament. Although 
one could perceive this as an effective strategy for exchanging political power (votes, 
coalitions) for funds towards community projects, this strategy certainly affects their 
democratic mandate and undermines long-term parliamentary practices and the 
overall political empowerment of these minority communities.  
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The other factor that obstructs RAE parliamentary activism is the prioritization 
of the Serb community within Kosovo institutions and by international actors, which 
results from the political situation in Kosovo, and notably pressure from Serbia. It is 
evident that in all institutional mechanisms dedicated to communities in Kosovo, Serb 
community members are elected as chairs and control the agenda of activities and the 
allocation of funds. An Egyptian MP expressed dissatisfaction that the chair of CRIC 
is always a member of the Serb community, claiming that such a situation creates 
obstacles for other, smaller communities when raising issues related to the protection 
of their rights and interests (public investment and employment, allocation of funds, 
and so on).26 However, despite these external constrictions, if non-Serb communities 
showed greater commitment to working together they would be able to make far 
better use of the consultative bodies.  
Contribution to governmental programming 
 
Minority consultative mechanisms are also entitled to engage in developing, 
implementing and evaluating governmental programmes dedicated to minority 
communities. This includes participating in assessing community needs, setting policy 
priorities, disseminating information, fund-raising, and monitoring and evaluating the 
performance of programmes. In the Kosovo context, the Office for Community 
Affairs is considered the suitable forum for performance of these tasks. However, so 
far it appears that the OCA has been negatively affected by political interference in 
the allocation of resources and setting of priorities, internal overlapping of activities, 
and disproportionate attention to the Serb minority. Although it is difficult to provide 
tangible evidence of political interference, first-hand accounts from our field research 
indicate that this may well be the case. For instance, a minority activist noted that 
there is continuous political interference from the government and the international 
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donors.27 The same person, speaking in confidence, declared that “within OCA there 
is nepotism, favouring of certain people, and political trade-offs”.28 Further detailed 
investigation would be necessary to examine whether there is political interference in 
the work the OCA. 
It should be noted that the OCA is also tasked with monitoring implementation 
of the RAE Strategy. However, since the resignation of a Roma staff member from 
the OCA there seems to have been reduced attention and support for implementation 
of the strategy. This is further exacerbated by confusion in the respective mandates of 
the OCA and the Office of Good Governance. The latter is also located within the 
Office of the Prime Minister and was initially tasked with implementing the RAE 
Strategy.  
Participation in reporting to international mechanisms 
 
While international best practice suggests that minority consultative bodies should 
contribute to enhancing minority rights through regular reporting to international 
human and minority rights monitoring bodies, in Kosovo the consultative mechanisms 
do not explicitly exercise this task. In principle multiple international organizations, 
together with local NGOs, monitor the situation of minority rights. According to 
Ahtisaari’s Comprehensive Status Settlement, the International Civilian Office and 
Representative (ICO/ICR) is charged with responsibility for supervising the 
implementation of provisions on minority affairs, including decentralization (UN 
Security Council, 2007).  
Despite the fact that ICO has engaged in lobbying on issues such as the need 
for a separate budget line and inclusion of the Croatian community in the Council, 
there are voices among communities who criticize the ICR for ignoring queries from 
RAE representatives in the Council and in the CRIC. An Ashkali MP declared that “in 
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several cases we have sent requests to the ICO on communal issues (eg. Lipjan), but 
they did not provide any response”; he believes “they are interested only in Serb 
interests”.29 On another occasion, an Egyptian MP and member of CRIC declared that 
he had approached ICO on matters of discrimination in employment in public 
institutions, but the ICO did not agree to meet with him. Indeed, these cases create 
doubts as to whether the international presence in post-independence Kosovo is 
focused only on enhancing Serb minority rights and interests, and leaving aside other 
smaller and marginalized minorities.  
 
Conclusion 
 
This paper examined the practical implications and contextual difficulties that have 
obstructed the right to effective participation among minority communities in Kosovo. 
It has highlighted that RAE representatives, as members of non-dominant minorities, 
have achieved limited results through the co-decision, consultation and coordination 
mechanisms in Kosovo. This is largely the result of a number of factors, including a 
lack of inter-institutional cooperation and coordination, the lack of meaningful 
engagement when reviewing and commenting on legislative and policy initiatives; 
political interference; and a governmental and international focus on the Serb 
community, to the detriment of other communities. Above all, these shortcomings are 
the result of a lack of capacity and of qualified members, insufficient resources, and a 
lack of commitment among the Roma, Ashkali, and Egyptian representatives 
themselves to make effective use of these mechanisms. The overall weakness of RAE 
representation in these consultative mechanisms is also affected by the broader 
disfunctionality of RAE political community and civil society, which is generally the 
result of internal tension within these communities.  
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The criteria against which we have examined the performance of minority 
consultative bodies in Kosovo―namely their internal consolidation and 
representation, tangible and mandate-related results, and wider external support or 
obstacles―shows that these mechanisms are at present only in the early stages of 
development, and as such require more commitment and coordination from all parties 
involved.  
Nevertheless, searching for further causal factors, one could also argue that the 
limited achievements of minority consultative bodies in ensuring effective minority 
participation, to a large extent reflect broader structural problems in Kosovo. While 
this was not the focus of this paper, perhaps the partial willingness of the Kosovo 
authorities to make these bodies work shows that externally imposed institutional 
design risks producing limited results when there is insufficient local support and 
commitment. Hence one could argue that these mechanisms are more reflective of a 
symbolic commitment by Kosovo authorities to guarantee minority protection and 
effective minority participation, rather than a meaningful platform for producing 
tangible results and improving the lives of minority communities in Kosovo, 
especially of those minorities that are most vulnerable, namely the Roma, Ashkali and 
Egyptian communities. On the other hand, the limited space provided for effective 
minority participation by Kosovo’s dominant political elites reflects also a fear from 
antagonising the majority population, who equally suffer from unemployment, limited 
social assistance, and meaningful emancipation.  
To conclude, the fact-gathering nature of this paper provides useful empirical 
evidence that can contribute to ongoing theoretical discussions and policy 
prescriptions on effective minority participation. In particular it highlights the need 
for minority consultative bodies to serve primarily as a platform for the effective 
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emancipation of non-dominant minorities, rather than as an elusive participatory 
space which fails to accurately reflect the needs and interests of the communities it 
was designed to serve.  
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Notes 
 
1 For the justification invoked to recognize Kosovo’s independence see: G. Bolton and G. 
Visoka, ‘Recognizing Kosovo’s independence: Remedial secession or earned 
sovereignty?’. Occasional Paper, No. 11/10, SESSOX, University of Oxford, October 
2010. 
2 George, A.L. and A. Bennett. Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences. 
Cambridge MA: MIT Press, 2005. George and Bennett argue that case study methods 
are suitable for accumulating theoretical knowledge across all schools of thought, 
including those studies that give primacy to material or ideational aspects of the 
social world. 
3 Council of Europe, Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, 1995, 
Art. 15; Similarly the United Nations and the OSCE have emphasized the right of 
minorities to participate effectively in decision-making on national, regional and local 
levels. 
4 OSCE, Lund Recommendations for the Effective Participation of National Minorities in 
Public Life, 1999, para. 12.  
5 See: Mason, D. and J.D. Meernik. Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding in Post-War 
Societies: Sustaining the peace. Oxford & New York: Routledge, 2006; I. O’Flynn. 
Deliberative Democracy and Divided Societies. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University 
Press, 2006; A.K. Jarstad and T.D. Sisk. From War to Democracy: Dilemmas of 
Peacebuilding. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008. 
6 See: King, I. and W. Mason. Peace at Any Price: How the World Failed Kosovo. London: 
Hurst and Company, 2006; Weller, M. Contested Statehood: Kosovo’s Struggle for 
Independence. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008; B. Reka. UNMIK as an 
International Governance in Post-War Kosova: NATO’s Intervention, UN 
Administration and Kosovar Aspiration. Shkup: LogosA, 2003; and A. Beha and G. 
Visoka, ‘Human security as ethnic security in Kosovo’. Human Security Perspectives 
7(1) (2010), 83-101.  
7 UNMIK Regulation 2001/9, On a Constitutional Framework for Provisional Self-
Government in Kosovo, 15 May 2001. 
8 For an overview of the history and identity of the Roma, Ashkali, and Egyptian 
communities see: N. Malcolm, Kosovo, A Short History. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2002, 205-9; A. Fraser, The Gypsies (The Peoples of Europe). London: Wiley-
Blackwell, 1995, 45-56; C. Baldwin, Minority Rights in Kosovo under International 
Rule. London: MRGI, 2006; J. Briza. Minority Rights in Yugoslavia. London: MRGI, 
2000. 
9 Humanitarian Law Centre (HLC). Ethnic Communities in Kosovo in 2007 and 2008. 
Prishtina: HLC, 2008; Council of Europe, Report of the Council of Europe 
Commissioner for Human Rights’ Special Mission to Kosovo, CommDH(2009)23, 23 
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– 27 March 2009, p.23 For a brief overview of the Roma, Ashkali and Egyptian 
History see: Visoka, Gezim. ‘Political Parties and Minority Participation: Case of 
Roma, Ashkalia and Egyptians in Kosovo’. In Political Parties and Minority 
Participation, ed. Florian Bieber. Skopje: FES, 2008. 
10 The Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo, 15 June 2008, Art. 60. Text available at 
<http://www.kushtetutakosoves.info/?cid=2,258>. The Statute and Regulation of the 
Council provide a detailed outline of the functions. 
11 Prime Minister’s Office for Community Affairs Briefing Document, August 2008, 
Prishtina. 
12 Interview with an Ashkali civil society representative in the Council, June 2010.  
13 Interview with a Roma civil society activist who decided to remain confidential, June 
2010. 
14 Interview with an Egyptian Civil Society Representative in the Council, 23 June 2010. 
15 Interview with an Ashkali Civil Society Representative in the Council, 22 June 2010. 
16 Interview with an Ashkali MP in Kosovo Assembly, Member of CRIC, June 2010. 
17 Interview with an Ashkali civil society activist who chose to remain anonymous, June 
2010. 
18 Interview with an Ashkali MP who chose to remain anonymous, June 2010. 
19 Ibid. 
20 Interview with an Egyptian MP in Kosovo Assembly, June 2010. 
21 See: KDI Scorecard measuring system. 
22 IRDK (New Democratic Initiative of Kosova); PREBK (New United Roma Party of 
Kosovo); PDAK (Democratic Party of Kosovo Ashkali).  
23 Interview with an Ashkali MP in Kosovo Assembly, Member of CRIC, June 2010. 
24 Ibid. 
25 Interview with an Ashkali MP in Kosovo Assembly, Member of CRIC, June 2010. 
26 Interview with an Egyptian MP in Kosovo Assembly, June 2010. 
27 Interviewees requested to remain anonymous to this point. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Interview with an Ashkali MP in Kosovo Assembly, Member of CRIC, June 2010. 
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